Tag Archives: Student loans in the United States

Fitch Gives 12 National Collegiate Student Loan Trust Transactions ‘Outlook Negative’ Ratings!

As you may or may not know National Collegiate Student Loans is American Education Services which is of course the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA). All of the National Collegiate Trusts listed below can be found HERE PHEAA’s website and HERE the Irish Stock Exchange.

P.S. Despite Fitch and ‘National Collegiate’s’ assertion that the Loans held or rather owned by the National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts are Private Student Loans…they are NOT! The National Collegiate loans are FEDERAL FFELP LOANS that were FRAUDULENTLY CONSOLIDATED WITHOUT THE BORROWERS KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT!

If you received federal student loans in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, or 2007 that were or are serviced by American Education Services (AES) then it may be worth your while to look into this!

NEW YORK–(BUSINESS WIRE)–Fitch Ratings has affirmed all ratings across 12 National Collegiate Student Loan Trust (NCSLT) transactions.

The affirmations reflect the stable loss coverage multiples of the trusts since Fitch’s last review on Jan. 29, 2010, which continue to reflect high default levels in excess of Fitch’s initial expectations.

In addition, Fitch removes from Rating Watch Negative and subsequently assigns Negative Rating Outlooks to NCSLT 2006-3 through 2007-2 to reflect Fitch’s overall view of the private student loan sector. The Outlook remains Negative on non-distressed ratings in NCSLT 2003-1 through 2006-2. These actions are based upon Fitch’s Global Structured Finance Criteria and U.S. Private Student Loan ABS Criteria.

For each trust, Fitch conducted a review of the collateral performance that involved the calculation of loss coverage multiples based on the most recent variables. A projected net loss amount was compared to available credit enhancement to determine the loss multiples. Fitch used historical vintage loss data provided by the issuer to form a loss timing curve representative of the private student loan collateral pools of each trust. After giving credit for seasoning of loans in repayment, Fitch applied the current cumulative gross loss level to this loss timing curve to derive the expected gross losses over the remaining life for each trust. A recovery rate of 25% was applied, which assumes no further payments from TERI other than the funded pledge accounts.

The available credit enhancement for the trusts consists of excess spread, overcollateralization (if any), and subordination where applicable. Fitch assumed excess spread to be the lesser of the historical average excess spread (earning on the assets minus interest payments to bondholders and fees) and the most recent 12-month average excess spread, and applied that same rate over the remaining life. Given the high default forecasts relative to the remaining pool balance, the multiples were compressed to achieve through-the-cycle rating stability.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2003-1:
–Class A-6 at ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-7 at ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-IO at ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class B-1 at ‘Csf’;
–Class B-2 at ‘Csf’.

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-1:
–Class A-2 at ‘BB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-3 at ‘BB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-4 at ‘BB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-IO-2 at ‘BB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class B-1 at ‘Csf’;
–Class B-2 at ‘Csf’.

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-2/NCF Grantor Trust 2004-2:
–Class A-3 at ‘BBB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-4 at ‘BBB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-5 1 at ‘BBB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-5 2 at ‘BBB+sf; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-IO at ‘BBB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class B at ‘BB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
Class C at ‘CCCsf’.

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-1/NCF Grantor Trust 2005-1:
–Class A-2 at ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-3 at ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-4 at ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-5 1 at ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-5 2 at ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class B at ‘BB-sf’; Outlook Negative’;
–Class C at ‘CCsf‘.

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-2/NCF Grantor Trust 2005-2:
–Class A-2 at ‘BBB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-3 at ‘BBB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-4 at ‘BBB-‘sf; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-5-1 at ‘BBB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-5-2 at ‘BBB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-IO at ‘BBB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class B at ‘B+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class C at ‘CCsf’.

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-3/NCF Grantor Trust 2005-3:
–Class A-2 at ‘BBB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-3 at ‘BBB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-4 at ‘BBB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-5-1 at ‘BBB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-5-2 at ‘BBB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-IO-1 at ‘BBB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-IO-2 at ‘BBB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class B at ‘BB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class C at to ‘CCsf’.

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-1:
–Class A-2 at ‘BB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-3 at ‘BB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-4 at ‘BB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-5 at ‘BB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-IO at ‘BB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class B at ‘B+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class C at ‘CCsf’.

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-2:
Class A-1 at ‘BB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-2 at ‘BB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A- at ‘BB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-4 at ‘BB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-IO at ‘BB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class B at ‘CCCsf’;
–Class C at ‘CCsf’.

Fitch has removed from Rating Watch Negative, affirmed, and assigned Outlooks to the following classes as indicated:

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-3:
–Class A-2 at ‘BBB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-3 at ‘BBB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-4 at ‘BBB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-5 at ‘BBB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-IO at ‘BBB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class B at ‘BB+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class C at ‘B+sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class D at ‘CCCsf’.

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-4:
–Class A-1 at ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-2 at ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-3 at ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-4 at ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-IO at ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class B at ‘BBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class C at ‘Bsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class D at ‘CCsf’.

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-1:
–Class A-1 at ‘BBB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-2 at ‘BBB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-3 at ‘BBB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-4 at ‘BBB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-IO at ‘BBB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class B at ‘BBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class C at ‘Bsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class D at ‘CCsf’.

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-2:
–Class A-1 at ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-2 at ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-3 at ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-4 at ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class A-IO at ‘BBBsf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class B at ‘BBB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class C at ‘BB-sf’; Outlook Negative;
–Class D at ‘CCCsf’.

Applicable Criteria and Related Research:

–‘Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria’, dated Aug. 13, 2010;
–‘U.S. Private Student Loan Criteria’, dated Aug. 24, 2009;
–‘Rating US Federal Family Education Loan Program Student Loan ABS’, dated April 11, 2008;
–‘Fitch to Begin Review of U.S. FFELP SLABS Applying Updated Criteria’, dated June 29, 2010;
–‘Fitch to Gauge Basis Risk in Auction-Rate U.S. FFELP SLABS Review’, dated Sept. 22, 2010.

Applicable Criteria and Related Research:
Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria
http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=547326
U.S. Private Student Loan ABS Criteria
http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=463174
Rating US Federal Family Education Loan Program Student Loan ABS Criteria
http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=382306

ALL FITCH CREDIT RATINGS ARE SUBJECT TO CERTAIN LIMITATIONS AND DISCLAIMERS. PLEASE READ THESE LIMITATIONS AND DISCLAIMERS BY FOLLOWING THIS LINK: HTTP://FITCHRATINGS.COM/UNDERSTANDINGCREDITRATINGS. IN ADDITION, RATING DEFINITIONS AND THE TERMS OF USE OF SUCH RATINGS ARE AVAILABLE ON THE AGENCY’S PUBLIC WEBSITE ‘WWW.FITCHRATINGS.COM‘. PUBLISHED RATINGS, CRITERIA AND METHODOLOGIES ARE AVAILABLE FROM THIS SITE AT ALL TIMES. FITCH’S CODE OF CONDUCT, CONFIDENTIALITY, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, AFFILIATE FIREWALL, COMPLIANCE AND OTHER RELEVANT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FROM THE ‘CODE OF CONDUCT’ SECTION OF THIS SITE.

Contacts

Fitch Ratings
Primary Analyst
Emily Lee, +1-212-908-0667
Director
One State Street Plaza
New York, NY 10004
or
Committee Chairperson
Cynthia Ullrich, +1-212-908-0609
Senior Director
or
Media Relations:
Brian Bertsch, New York, +1-212-908-0549
brian.bertsch@fitchratings.com

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Filed under 9.5 percent, 9.5 percent SAP, American Education Services, federal direct loans, federal financial aid, FFELP, for-profit colleges, for-profit schools, fraud, higher education, muni bond fraud, muni bond probe, municipal bonds, PHEAA, PLUS, Stafford, student loan lenders, student loan program, student loan scandal, student loans, Uncategorized

UPDATE AND CORRECTION: The List Keeps Growing:The Student Loan Industry’s DIRTY Secret

A special purpose entity (SPE; or, especially in Europe, special purpose vehicle/SPV, in Ireland – FVC financial vehicle corporation) is a legal entity (usually a limited company of some type or, sometimes, a limited partnership) created to fulfill narrow, specific or temporary objectives. SPEs are typically used by companies to isolate the firm from financial risk. A company will transfer assets to the SPE for management or use the SPE to finance a large project thereby achieving a narrow set of goals without putting the entire firm at risk. SPEs are also commonly used in complex financings to separate different layers of equity infusion. In addition, they are commonly used to own a single asset and associated permits and contract rights (such as an apartment building or a power plant), to allow for easier transfer of that asset. Moreover, they are an integral part of public private partnerships common throughout Europe which rely on a project finance type structure-WIKIPEDIA

IF THIS REMINDS YOU OF THE HOUSING BUBBLE I.E. THE STOREFRONT ,MORTGAGE LENDERS THEN YOU’RE BEGINNING TO UNDERSTAND WHAT’S GOING ON AND WHY YOU’RE DEBT KEEPS GROWING AND GROWING AND GROWING AND GROWING!

Banks partnered with student loan guaranty agencies, student loan servicers, and other banks to create student loan brokerage firms aka student loan special purpose entities the majority of which were incorporated in State of Florida. For example, Student Loan Xpress, Goal Financial, K2 Financial, Education Finance Partners, US Education Finance etc. Kinda like the storefront mortgage companies and unlicensed brokers, think Enron’s LJM2, the Raptors, Chewco etc

The bank ffelp lenders, servicers and guaranty agencies used the student loan brokerage companies to access and repeatedly access students’ personal information, nslds, and credit reports for what they claimed were Marketing or Promotional Purposes. If you don’t believe me then just check your credit reports from 2006-2008. I bet you’ll have 3 ‘Promotional Purpose’ pages that are all student loan companies. Unfortunately, they weren’t accessing your reports for marketing purposes as they claimed. They were accessing the reports for your personal information which they unlawfully used to originate federal consolidation loans.

The Education Department’s Office of Inspector General found that American Education Services/Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Authority  (CLICK THE LINK I PROMISE IT’S WORTH IT!) received about $33 million in overpayments — and possibly much more — under an exemption in federal law that allowed lenders that financed the student loans they issued using tax-exempt bonds issued before 1993 to earn a government subsidized interest rate of 9.5 percent. Congress engaged in several aborted attempts to fully close the loophole throughout the 1990s and the early part of this decade, but some lenders continued to find ways to take advantage of it by recycling the pre-1993 loan funds, before Congress, as part of the Higher Education Reconciliation Act, finally closed it permanently last year.

Guess how they did it? You guessed it, by partnering with lenders to create student loan brokerage firms, special purpose entities and special purpose vehicles that unlawfully used your personal information to create federal consolidation loans. The lenders then used the fraudulent consolidations loans to replace loans that defeased, were repaid or discharged in their 9.5 percent floor loan securitized trusts and student loan revenue bonds. Consequently, because the federal consolidation loans were unlawfully created by the student loan brokerage firms (lenders + servicers + guaranty agencies) theft of your personal information they are not valid obligations; thus they are not enforceable! So, in protest of the nearly $1 trillion dollar student loan debt bubble and your ASTRONOMICAL student loan debt that’s growing bigger by the day pull your NSLDS report highlight that fraudulent loan, complete an UNAUTHORIZED SIGNATURE / UNAUTHORIZED PAYMENT false certification discharge form, and send it to fraudnet@gao.gov!

Don’t forget to name your lender, servicer, and guaranty agency on the discharge form and attach your NSLDS report with showing the fraudulent consolidation loan you never applied for or agreed to!

So without further ado here are a few of the Student Loan Special Purpose Entities that you should LOOK FOR ON YOUR CREDIT REPORTS. Please note this list is a daily work in progress and by no means complete:

National Collegiate Trust/                                                         PHEAA/American Education Services

American Educational Loan Services                               PHEAA/American Education Services


MRU HOLDINGS:                                                                             J.P. Morgan Chase, Key Bank, Morgan Stanley,

                                                                                                                       Lehman Bros, Assured Guaranty,

                                                                                                                        Global Securitization Service, LLC,

 Sallie Mae
J.P. Morgan Chase,

Bank of America,

J.C. Flowers & Co.,

Friedman Fleischer & Lowe.

First National Wachovia
First Savings Wachovia
Affinity Direct d/b/a Educational Direct Citibank Student Loans
Credit Card Protection Bain Capital Ventures

Bain Private Equity

CORTRUST Bank Citibank
Academic Funding Foundation Educaid/

Wachovia/

Class Notes Inc

Erie Processing Corp Wachovia
Xanthus Higher Education ABN AMRO
Student Loan Processors US Bank
K2 Financial Ceigis LLC

ACS-Education

Discover

University Financial Lenders Bank of New York
Educational Lending Group Citibank
Post Collegiate Financial First American Title Ins.

Wachovia

Federal Family Education Wachovia Securities
Goal Financial Cit Group/Bank of New York
American Educational Loan Processing PHEAA/

American Education Services

Student Loan Xpress Bank of Lake Mills,

Citibank,

AMACAR,

HedgeForum Renaissance

Education Finance Partners

Education Finance Partners ACS Inc
PHEAA/American Education Services Citibank

Wachovia

Academic Finance Corporation ACS/

US Bank

Amerifund Education Corporation ACS/

Fifth Third/

RBC Bank/

US Bank

Ardent Financial, LLC/NSL Direct Citibank
US Education Finance PHEAA/

AES,

ACS,

Citibank,

Wachovia

Academic Financial Services ACS
Acapita Education Finance Corporation ACS/

US Bank

AMS Education ACS/

Bank One/

Sallie Mae

Fleet National Bank

Student Capital Corporation ACS/

Deutsch/

Bank of New York/

P Morgan Chase/

Citibank

Studentloans.com ACS/

Brazos/

Wells Fargo

Bosque HEA AES/

Wells Fargo Bank/

ACS

Pecos Student Finacnial Corp AES/

US Bank

us Education Finance Corporation AES
US Contracting Corp PHEAA/

AES

American Educational Services PHEAA/

AES

Education Funding Resources Cit Group
Education Lending Group Cit Group
Education Finance Partners ACS/

Cit GROUP/

HedgeForum Renaissance

Wachovia

AMACAR

Grad Partners Student Loan Xpress/

Education Lending Group

Cit Group


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Filed under 9.5 percent, 9.5 percent SAP, American Education Services, federal direct loans, federal financial aid, FFELP, for-profit colleges, for-profit schools, fraud, higher education, muni bond fraud, muni bond probe, municipal bonds, PHEAA, PLUS, Stafford, student loan lenders, student loan program, student loan scandal, student loans, Uncategorized

The Root Cause of Your Student Loan Miseries….The 9.5 Percent Special Allowance Payment Subsidy

Intended to Cut Lender Subsidies, It Created a Windfall

In the guaranteed student loan program, lenders receive interest payments from both students and the government. Under the 1980 law, the government payments (known as “special allowance payments”) assured lenders a quarterly return on their guaranteed student loans equal to the average bond-equivalent yield on 91-day Treasury bills plus 3.5 percentage points. Any quarter when borrower payments were insufficient, the government would make up the difference. (Loans made today receive the 91-day commercial paper rate plus 2.34 percentage points during repayment.) For loans backed by tax-exempt bonds, the 1980 formula cut subsidy payments in half but guaranteed at least a 9.5 percent return. In other words, lenders receive the greater of either (a) one-half the regular subsidy payments or (b) the amount necessary to provide a 9.5 percent return.[1]

Example 1: In times of high interest rates, the formula reduces subsidies.

Under interest rates prevalent in 1979, the new formula cuts lender returns from 13.5 percent to 10.25 percent.10

 

Regular Loans:

 

Student Rate                                        Special Allowance:                       Lender Return:

7.0%                                                        6.5%                                       13.5%

 

Loans Made with Tax-Exempt Bonds:

Special Allowance:                                                                                  Lender Return:

3.25%                                                                                                   10.25%

Example 2: But with the lower rates that have been more typical in recent years, the 9.5 percent floor creates windfall profits.

In the second quarter of 2004, regular loans earned a 3.57 percent return, including only 0.15 percentage points in federal subsidies. Loans eligible for the 9.5 percent floor collected 25 times more in federal subsidies.[2]

 

Regular Loans:

 

Student Rate                                          Special Allowance:                 Lender Return:

3.42%                                                      0.15%                                      3.57%

 

 

Loans Made with Tax-Exempt Bonds:

Special Allowance:                                                                             Lender Return:6.08%                                                                                                  9.5%

 

 

The 1993 Attempt to Repeal 9.5 Loans

In early 1993, the borrower interest rate on regular new student loans fell to 6.15 percent, highlighting the absurdity of guaranteeing a 9.5 percent return on tax-exempt loans.12 Congress decided to try again to fix the problem.The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 eliminated the 1980 formula for all loans financed with new student loan bonds. However, responding to arguments that bond investors need stable, assured returns, it kept the 1980 formula for loans backed by existing bonds, including loans made with collections from earlier loans. It seemed like a limited liability, confined only to pre-existing bonds, and involving non-profit and government entities.[3]



[1]Money for Nothing • Skyrocketing Waste of Tax Dollars • A Report by TICAS:The Institute for College Access and Success


[2]Author’s calculations based on U.S. Department of Education,“Federal Family Education Loan Program Special

Allowance Rates for the Quarter Ending June 30, 2004,” July 6, 2004.


[3] General Accounting Office and U.S. Department of Education, Final Report Regarding the Findings of the Study Group on the Feasibility of Using Alternative Financial Instruments for Determining Lender Yield under the Federal Family Education Loan Program, January 19, 2001, pp. 120, 123.

 

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Brief Interlude

I know the first two posts were pretty long and full of facts but I ask that you bear with me. In order to understand today’s massive ongoing fraud by the student loan lenders and the crippling debt it is causing first I need to explain the history of student loans. I promise you’ll thank me later!

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BACKGROUND-STUDENT LOAN PROGRAM

PURPOSE OF THE STUDENT LOAN PROGRAM

Student loans were designed to put many students who wouldn’t have ordinarily been able to afford higher education, into colleges and universities. The U.S. government actually believed that education was the primary responsibility of the parents. But they also recognized that many parents just couldn’t afford to send their children to college, no matter how much they wanted to.[1]

GREED REPLACES PURPOSE

Today in the student loan program, thousands of corporate and government entities enjoy, by law, a contractual right of payment from the U.S. government—all part of the effort to lubricate the system with enough cash so that students ultimately get the loans they need. The current entitlements include the following:

  • Thirty-six federally-backed “guarantee agencies” are entitled to a .4% “loan processing and issuance fee,” paid by the federal government. These agencies are also entitled to a .1% “account” maintenance fee,” paid by the federal government, and they have the legal authority to charge students a 1% “guarantee fee.”
  • Thousands of banks and secondary markets (which purchase loans from banks) are entitled to quarterly returns equal to the rates on commercial paper plus 2.34 percentage points during repayment and plus 1.74 percentage points during the in-school and grade period, assured by the federal government.
  • If a borrower’s payments are late, the guarantee agency has an opportunity to encourage the borrower to make a payment. If successful, the agency is entitled to a 1% “default aversion fee.”
  • If the borrower defaults, the lender or secondary market is entitled to receive a minimum payment of 98% of the principal and interest.
  • If a loan defaults, the guarantee agency is entitled to keep 28% of any amounts it is able to collect. All of these provisions—and more—are set and adjusted through the political process, without the benefit of competitive market forces or even a regulatory check.

This patchwork quilt system leads to a second problem: unanticipated loopholes, requiring legislative repairs that further complicate the system. Over the years, the troubles have included lenders that timed their requests for federal payments in order to hide high default rates, guarantee agencies that had conflicts-of interest with board members and affiliates, and schools that used multiple intermediaries in order to mask large increases in loan volume. All of these situations cost taxpayers. In one case, the collapse of a guarantee agency led to an expensive federal taxpayer bailout. The Government Accountability Office (known then as the General Accounting Office) has repeatedly labeled student aid as a creating a high risk of waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. President Bush’s budget office describes the FFEL program as structurally flawed, with “unnecessary subsidies” and questionable cost effectiveness.[2]


[1] Financial Shopper Network The History of Student Loans

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